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AN EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF JUVENILE LIFE
WITHOUT PAROLE: EXTENDING GRAHAMTO ALL
JUVENILE OFFENDERS
ROBERT JOHNSON, PH.D.*
CHRIS MILLER**
In 2005, the Supreme Court in Roper v. SimmonsI held that the
death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment when applied to
juveniles.2 Graham v. Florida3 followed, proscribing sentences of life
without parole for juveniles convicted of non-homicide crimes.
Analyzing Supreme Court precedent in light of evidence on the
deleterious effects of prison life, both psychologically and in terms of
assaults on human dignity, we argue that the abolition of juvenile life
without parole sentences in all cases, not simply non-homicide cases,
is a logical extension of the analytical framework articulated in Roper
and Graham.
In Part I of this article, we review the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on juvenile culpability in relation to the death penalty
and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.5 We argue that
the reasons on which the Supreme Court relied when invalidating the
death penalty for juveniles in Roper are equally applicable to life
without parole. In both the death penalty and life without parole, in
which prisoners are sentenced to die in prison,6 death is the end result.
That death, moreover, is in both instances hastened by the actions of
the state.
In Part II we argue that, since there is no meaningful distinction
between the death penalty and life without parole, the oft-cited notion
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1. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
2. Id. at 578-79.
3. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
4. Id. at 2034.
5. We recognize that very long sentences-some sentences are effectively beyond the
human lifespan-are the functional equivalent of life without parole sentences. The term "life
imprisonment without parole" is meant to capture all sentences that effectively preclude
release from prison, including lengthy sentences that exceed the human lifespan.
6. Robert Johnson & Sonia Tabriz, Death by Incarceration as a Cruel and Unusual
Punishment When Applied To Juveniles: Extending Roper to Life Without Parole, Our Other
Death Penalty, 9 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASs 241, 241-42 (2009).
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that "death is different" from all other punishments, articulated in
Supreme Court jurisprudence,7 is an untenable justification for the
disparate treatment of juveniles sentenced to life without parole.
In Part III we examine juvenile life without parole in an Eighth
Amendment context by reviewing the Supreme Court's criteria for
determining the constitutionality of a given punishment and applying
these criteria to life without parole. We present a definition of what it
means to be a human being, and use that definition to examine the
Court's pronouncements about punishment and human dignity.
In Part IV we examine life without parole in light of the four
legally recognized justifications for punishment: deterrence,
retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 8 Subjecting juveniles to
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole clearly and
unambiguously fails to serve any penological justification other than
retribution, and ultimately serves the ends of retribution in ways that
are not suitable in the case of juveniles. The limited retributive benefits
of juvenile life without parole sentences must be weighed against the
loss of potential rehabilitative benefits when juveniles are exposed to a
life-long punishment in a setting that violates notions of decency and
human dignity in ways that are particularly pernicious for them. We
conclude in Part V that life without parole is an unduly harsh and
hence cruel and unusual sanction when applied to juveniles.
I. JURISPRUDENTIAL OVERVIEW OF JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE
A. Past Jurisprudence Regarding Juvenile Culpability
In the 1982 case Eddings v. Oklahoma,9 the Court observed
that "[y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and
condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence
and to psychological damage." The Court expanded on this theme in
Roper v. Simmons, II declaring that juveniles manifest "a lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility."' 2 The Court
7. As Chief Justice Roberts notes in Graham, there is a "longstanding view" in
Supreme Court jurisprudence "that 'the death penalty is different from other punishments in
kind rather than degree."' Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2038-39 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 294 (1983)). See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
8. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028.
9. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
10. Id. at 115.
11. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
12. Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
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acknowledged that juveniles are more vulnerable, and hence
susceptible to negative outside influences.13 Most importantly, the
Court found that the actions of juveniles are not the result of
depravity.14 Writing for the majority in Roper, Justice Kennedy stated
that
The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their
identity means it is less supportable to conclude that
even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is
evidence of irretrievably depraved character. From a
moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the
failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater
possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies
will be reformed.' 5
This body of jurisprudence supports the conclusion that
juveniles "cannot with reliability be classified among the worst
offenders,"' 6 and formed the basis for a decision exempting juveniles
from the death penalty in Roper.17 Such arguments apply with equal
force to the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. This is particularly true since the Court has made findings in
Roper and Graham about life without parole as applied to juveniles
that indicate the comparability of these sanctions. 18
B. Graham v. Florida
In Graham v. Florida, the controlling Supreme Court case on
juvenile life without parole, the Court held that a juvenile cannot be
sentenced to life imprisonment for a non-homicide crime.19 The case
involved a juvenile who was sentenced to life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole after being convicted for armed robbery.20 The
Court found that juveniles were inherently immature and therefore less
13. Id. at 569.
14. See, e.g., id. at 570, 573.
15. Id. at 570.
16. Id. at 569.
17. See id. at 572 ("To the extent the juvenile death penalty might have residual
deterrent effect, it is worth noting that the punishment of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person"). See also
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
18. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
19. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034 ("The constitution prohibits the imposition of a life
without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.").
20. Id. at 2017-18.
1032012]
U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
culpable for their criminal behavior. Furthermore, the Court, drawing
on Roper, recognized that juveniles are malleable beings, whose
characters have not been fully formed.21 The Court, again drawing on
Roper, explicitly stated that as compared to adult offenders, a "greater
possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be
reformed."22 As a result of these findings, the Court held that a
juvenile cannot be sentenced to life without parole for a non-homicide
23
crime.
This holding, however, does not ban life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole for juveniles who commit homicide crimes.
Yet, the severity of the crime committed does not change the nature of
the finding: juveniles who commit homicides are still juveniles. Since,
as Graham held, juveniles are immature, less culpable, malleable, and
more likely to be reformed, the Court should expand its holding to ban
life without parole for juveniles committing homicide crimes. A court
cannot reasonably conclude that a given population, in this case
juveniles, is capable of reform and then allow some of them to receive
a punishment-life without parole-that destroys hope and, as a
consequence, virtually precludes any possibility of reform.24 This is
especially true because, as Graham noted, prisons often deny
offenders sentenced to life without parole the opportunity to
participate in any sort of rehabilitation programs.25 By allowing a
juvenile to be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole, even for a narrow variety of crimes, we are essentially saying
that society's interest in punishing a certain group of immature and
marginally culpable people outweighs any efforts at rehabilitation,
even when the possibility of rehabilitation, or at least abstention from
crime, is quite real.26
21. Id. at 2026-27.
22. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)).
23. Id. at 2034.
24. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 6, at 251, 254 ("A sentence of death by incarceration
extinguishes the juvenile's life in a free society, condemning him to a mere existence in the
often brutal netherworld of prison . . . Meaningful, positive change is only possible if juvenile
offenders have some hope that they may one day return to society").
25. See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029-30.
26. See generally EDWARD P. MULVEY, HIGHLIGHTS FROM PATHWAYS TO DESISTANCE:
A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF SERIOUS ADOLESCENT OFFENDERS, OFF. JUv. JUST. &
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (MAR. 2011), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/230971.pdf. Research has established firmly that "most
youth who commit felonies greatly reduce their offending over time," and that the most
effective interventions that reduce juvenile offending occur in community-based programs,
often featuring substance abuse treatment. Id. at 1.
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C. Similarities Between Death and Life Imprisonment
In Graham, the Court observed that "the sentence [of life
without parole] alters the offender's life by a forfeiture that is
irrevocable. It deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without
giving hope of restoration." 2 7 Among those basic liberties is the hope
of release to the free society while the offender is alive. The reality is
that the offender will, in the words of one judge, "get to come out of
prison in a pine box."28 An irrevocable life sentence is aptly described
as "death by incarceration." 29 In both death by incarceration and death
by execution,
[d]eath is the intended and expected outcome of the
sentence. With both sanctions, death is untimely
because it is hastened by the actions of the state. These
deaths are also undignified, occurring with the stigma
of dying in the intrinsically degrading conditions of
America's maximum security prisons.30
The emphasis on irrevocability mimics the "death is different"
rationale that is offered in support of limitations on the death penalty.
Sentences of life without the possibility of parole for juveniles are akin
to a death sentence because these sentences halt the juveniles'
development before they have a chance to mature to a point at which
they can meaningfully take responsibility for their crimes.
The key role of character formation and culpability was
highlighted in Roper, where the death penalty was precluded because
execution prevents the juvenile from achieving "a mature
understanding of his own humanity" before he is put to death.3 1
Similarly, given the destructive and often adolescent quality of prison
life, an irrevocable life sentence essentially precludes any chance of
molding offenders into productive human beings who have a mature
understanding of their own humanity.
27. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027.
28. Lisa Rogers, Judge to Holladay: 'You get to come out of prison in a pine box'
GADSDEN TIMES (Jun. 26, 2009, 6:06 PM),
http://www.gadsdentimes.com/article/20090626/NEWS/906269983/-
I/NEWSO4?Title=Judge-to-Holladay-You-get-to-come-out-of-prison-in-a-pine-box-.
29. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 242.
30. Id at 248.
31. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
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Prisons are not settings of forgiveness. Nor are they
settings in which young persons can mature into
responsible, moral adults. Prisons are monuments to
punishment and exclusion, and the code of life in prison
embodies the exact sort of immaturity, impulsivity, and
aggression that the Court in Roper claims that uveniles
may overcome if given suitable punishments.3
Graham argued that juvenile offenders must be given some
meaningful chance to demonstrate reform. 3 3 Life sentences without the
possibility of parole deny them that chance.
Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized the added severity of
life without parole when applied to juveniles. In Graham, the Court
observed that
Life without parole is an especially harsh punishment
for a juvenile. Under this sentence a juvenile offender
will on average serve more years and a greater
percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender. A
16-year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to life
without parole receive the same punishment in name
only.34
With the abolition of parole in the federal system and most
state systems,35 a life sentence truly does mandate a life of punitive
and oppressive incarceration.36 Furthermore, unlike adults, juveniles
have not had the benefit of extensive maturing life experiences in the
free world. They often have far more years ahead of them than an adult
prisoner convicted of a comparable crime. While it is theoretically
possible to alter the terms of a sentence of life without the possibility
of parole, those facing such a punishment lack the avenues of
mandatory appellate review currently available only to death penalty
recipients.37 This remains true even though death by incarceration is
32. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 251.
33. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
34. Id. at 2028.
35. JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY
65, 68 (2003) (discussing the abolition of parole on the state and federal levels).
36. See id. at 221.
37. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 6, at 245, 246 (Death sentences "are frequently the
subject of successful litigation," whereas sentences of life without parole "are rarely voided or
changed for any reason," giving rise to the paradoxical conclusion that, in practice, life
without parole sentences "may well be more final and irrevocable than sentences of death").
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currently the most severe punishment available for juvenile offenders.
In point of fact, studies demonstrate that when sentences of life
without parole are reviewed on apeal, they are modified far less
frequently than are death sentences. Thus, it is correct to describe life
without parole as "a civil death," 39 by which juvenile "prisoners are
slated to spend the remainder of their natural lives behind bars, gaining
release only upon their deaths." 40
II. "DEATH IS DIFFERENT" IS A MISNOMER: LIFE IMPRISONMENT
WITHOUT PAROLE AND THE DEATH PENALTY ARE COMPARABLY
SEVERE
While the Supreme Court has consistently differentiated
between the protections accorded to those sentenced to death and those
sentenced to life imprisonment without parole by claiming that "death
is different," death is actually not different at all. Both a death sentence
and a sentence of life without the possibility of parole have the same
result: death. Furthermore, in both instances, death is caused by the
percipient actions of the State. "Offenders sentenced to death by
incarceration, like prisoners condemned to death by execution,
experience a final and irrevocable sentence that culminates in deaths
that are untimely and undignified."4 1
The more accurate statement, therefore, is that "execution is
different." When given a sentence of life without parole, death will
inevitably result. However, only with death sentences does the State
affirmatively undertake to execute a person. Therefore, the relevant
question is whether the distinction between dying in prison, versus
being executed in prison, constitutes a difference sufficient to justify
the imposition of a life without parole sentence upon juveniles.
The affirmative view in this matter was expressed as recently
as 2010 in Graham by Chief Justice Roberts. Roberts castigated his
colleagues for abandoning the position taken in Roper, which banned
the death penalty for juveniles partially because less severe
punishments, such as life imprisonment without parole, would remain
available.42 Though writing in concurrence with the judgment, Roberts
38. JAMES S. LIEBMAN, JEFFREY FAGAN, & VALERIE WEST, A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR
RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995, ii-iii (Jun. 12, 2000), available at
http://www2.1aw.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/liebman/liebman-final.pdf
39. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 6, at 245.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 246.
42. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2038-39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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opposed the imposition of a categorical rule against life without parole
in non-homicide cases.
[T]reating juvenile life sentences as analogous to
capital punishment is at odds with our longstanding
view that "the death penalty is different from other
punishments in kind rather than degree." It is also at
odds with Roper itself, which drew the line at capital
punishment by blessing juvenile sentences that are "less
severe than death" despite involving "forfeiture of some
of the most basic liberties." Indeed, Roper explicitly
relied on the possible imposition of life without parole
on some juvenile offenders .... 43
Despite Chief Justice Roberts' belief that the death penalty is
"different," research demonstrates that suffering experienced by those
sentenced to life without parole is comparable to, and in some cases
arguably worse than, that experienced by those sentenced to death,
some of whom expressly drop their appeals and opt for execution
rather than a life in prison.44
By its very terms, a sentence of life without parole requires a
permanent loss of liberty. Yet, life without parole entails pain on a
much deeper level than a loss of freedom. Prison deprives its
occupants of the autonomy to make even the simplest choices that
might influence the course of their lives. Freedom from prison is the
central goal and aspiration of life-sentence prisoners, yet nothing they
do in prison can help them achieve that goal. 45 The essentials of daily
life are regimented in prison, captured in a routine that never changes,
preventing prisoners from doin anything of consequence with their
profoundly circumscribed lives. Research suggests that lifers live in
an existential vacuum, isolated from the social relations that animate
normal lives and relegated to "a lifetime of boredom, doubt, and
anxiety punctuated by piercing moments of insight into one's failings
43. Id.
44. Robert Johnson & Sandra McGunigall-Smith, Life Without Parole, America's
Other Death Penalty: Notes on Life Under Sentences of Death by Incarceration, 88 PRISON J.
328, 335 (Jun. 2008). According to some statistics, roughly ten percent of condemned
prisoners drop their appeals and submit to execution, choosing death in the execution chamber
over life on death row or, in the best case scenario, life in prison after a successful capital
appeal. Id. at 333.
45. See id. at 336-39, 342-44, 332.
46. See id. at 338-39.
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as a human being." 4 7 This existence keeps them permanently separated
from friends and loved ones. Without the hope of joining the larger
society-implicitly understood by life sentence prisoners to be the real
world, the world that matters 48-their lives are denied larger meaning
49
or purpose.
The deprivations of prison life, moreover, fall most heavily on
juveniles, who typically lack the emotional maturity or capabilities
necessary to cope with such profound adversity.o The harmful effects
of imprisonment are particularly troubling in the case of juveniles
because of the sheer fact that the prisoner's young age, over which he
or she has no control, renders it impossible for the prisoner to fully
develop in the first place. Juveniles have much less experience of life
in the outside world with which to compare their incarceration than do
adults. Juveniles sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole are virtually guaranteed to spend more time in prison than
they did in the outside world. Since some juveniles are as young as
thirteen when they are incarcerated, the passage of years may mean
that prison is all they can clearly remember. For a juvenile who serves
long years of confinement as a lifer, prison becomes life as they know
it, making it almost certain that they will fail to develop into adults
"with a mature understanding of their own humanity."
III. JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE IN AN EIGHTH AMENDMENT
CONTEXT
From the very first modem death penalty case, Furman v.
Georgia,51 the Court has stated that the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meanin
as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."
Furthermore, the Court has steadfastly endorsed Chief Justice
Warren's conclusion in Trop v. Dulles that the Amendment "must
draw its meaning from the evolvin standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." In Atkins v. Virginia,54 the Court
47. Id. at 344.
48. See, e.g., ERIN GEORGE, A WOMAN DOING LIFE 230 (Oxford University Press 2010);
VICTOR HASSINE, LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: LIVING AND DYING IN PRISON TODAY 75 (Oxford
University Press 2011).
49. See Johnson, supra note 44, at 336-39.
50. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 6, at 244-50.
51. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
52. Id. at 242 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)).
53. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
54. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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stated that these conceptions of decency are to be judged not by
historical standards, but rather by "those that currently prevail."5 5
When assessing standards of decency, it is helpful to refer to
conclusions drawn by the Court in past cases. In his opinion in
Furman,56 Justice Brennan cites Trop 57 in holding that the Eighth
Amendment constitutes a broad prohibition against "inhumane
treatment" as manifested in "inhuman and uncivilized
punishments." 59 These prohibitions are animated by "nothing less than
the dignity of man."6 0 This inherent dignity undergirds the conviction
that "the State, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect
for their intrinsic worth as human beings."61 This intrinsic worth
protects humans from punishments that are "degrading" 62 to their
dignity. The considerations relevant to assessing whether a punishment
is inhumane or uncivilized are revisited in Roper and Graham. The
majority in Roper stated that "[b]y protecting even those convicted of
heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the
55. Id. at 311.
56. Furman v. Georgia was the first case to find the death penalty unconstitutional. See
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972). There was no majority opinion. See id. at
240. Instead, each Justice wrote a separate opinion. Id. Several of these opinions articulated
broad themes regarding the legitimacy of the death penalty, the legitimate goals of
punishment, and the proper method of analyzing punishments under the Eighth Amendment.
See, e.g., id. at 240-43 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306-08 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at
256-66 (Brennan, J., concurring). While these opinions did not have controlling weight in this
particular case, many of the themes articulated therein would reemerge in later Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646 (2008)
(holding that where the rape of a child does not result, and was not intended to result, in the
victim's death, the Eighth Amendment prevents Louisiana from imposing the death penalty);
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588-89 (2002) (holding that an Arizona statute allowing trial
judges to determine the presence or absence of aggravating factors necessary for the
imposition of the death penalty after a jury adjudication of guilt for first-degree murder
violates the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial).
57. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). In Trop, the Supreme Court ruled that loss of citizenship was an
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment for desertion of the Armed Forces during
wartime. Id. at 87, 91-93. The Court ruled that a punishment may be cruel and unusual simply
by being disproportionate to the crime for which it is given. Id. at 101. This case also
definitively established that the concept of "cruel and unusual punishments" is not static. Id. at
103. "The provisions of the Constitution are not time-worn adages or hollow shibboleths.
They are vital, living principles that authorize and limit governmental powers in our Nation."
Id. Rather, the applicability of the phrase to a given punishment must be judged according to
"evolving standards of decency." Id. at 101. This criteria is still used today.
58. Furman, 408 U.S. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 282.
60. Id. at 270.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 271.
[VOL. 12:1
JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
government to respect the dignity of all persons."63 As recently as last
year, in Graham, the Court observed that the State had a duty to
"respect the human attributes"64 in everyone. Thus, even those who
commit the worst crimes imaginable must be respected for their
inherent worth and dignity as human beings. 65
Analyzing whether a punishment runs afoul of these
prohibitions, Justice Brennan enumerated two guidelines that are
especially useful in the context of evaluating a sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Brennan stated that "a
punishment may be degrading simply by reason of its enormity."66
Tied to this is his conclusion that "if there is a significantly less severe
punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the
punishment is inflicted, the punishment inflicted is unnecessary, and
therefore excessive." 67 This latter finding is certainly applicable when
the State chooses to inflict a final, and as a practical matter,
irrevocable punishment on a marginally culpable convict, rather than
providing a punishment that serves the legitimate purpose of evincing
moral disapproval of criminal conduct without barring all
opportunities for rehabilitation and eventual return to society. When
the Court judges punishments, it makes Eighth Amendment
determinations based primarily on the themes of "decency" and
"dignity of man," but has neither defined these terms nor cited a
definition that it considers authoritative. Therefore, it is difficult to
apply the terms as definable legal concepts. Some guidance may be
found in the book Death Work, an earlier work by one of the authors
of this article, where a definition of humanity is articulated. Death
Work divides humanity into several components:
The essence of personhood or humanity is a sense of
self that conveys the capacity and moral right to make
choices and hence be self-determining. Self-
determination, in turn, both finds expression in and
presupposes ... some degree of (1) autonomy, defined
as the capacity to influence one's environment and
hence shape one's fate; (2) security, defined as the
capacity to find or create stability in one's world and
hence shelter oneself from harm; and (3) relatedness to
63. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
64. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021.
65. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
66. Furman, 408 U.S. at 273 (Brennan, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 279.
I112012]
U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
others, defined as the capacity to feel for oneself and
others and hence to have caring and constructive
relationships. 68
These dimensions of personhood or humanity are culled from
seminal works in the humanities and social sciences. Such
distinguished philosophers as Ernst Cassirer and Herbert Morris "have
identified the capacity to reason and hence to be responsible for
ourselves as the sina qua non of personhood."69 Abraham Maslow and
other existential psychologists "have seen security as the essential
psychological precondition to the unfolding of human nature,
observing that without stability and safety in one's world, self-
determination would give way to determination by external forces." 70
A host of scholars, including such luminaries as philosopher John
Dewey and anthropologist Lewis Mumford, "have seen relatedness to
others-to things outsides ourselves and, more specifically, to other
people-as basic to our nature as social animals that exercise self-
determination through self-defining transactions with the world."7'
Autonomy, security, and relatedness to others develop "in interaction
with one another as individuals become persons." 72 Ultimately,
"[e]ach individual makes over the life-course of the [human] species
and achieves a character and becomes a person. The more fully he
organizes his environment [autonomy], the more skillfully he
associates in groups [security], the more constantly he draws on his
social heritage [relatedness], the more does the person emerge from
society as its fulfillment and perfection." 73
A person or human being has inherent self-worth that is the
source of human dignity. Dignity, in turn, is "the sober, unshakable
knowledge of self-worth and the equally unshakable recognition of it
in others." 74 Our understanding of what it means to be a human
being-to appreciate our own humanity and that of others-creates a
bright line distinction: while punishments can legitimately deprive
persons of their liberty, they cannot degrade them by ignoring or
violating their essential human dignity. Society, in the administration
68. ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WORK: A STUDY OF THE MODERN EXECUTION PROCESS 204
(2d ed. 1998).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 204.
72. Id. at 205.
73. Id.
74. SUsIE LINFIELD, THE CRUEL RADIANCE: PHOTOGRAPHY AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
111 (2010).
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of criminal punishments, must treat prisoners with a degree of
empathy and accord them a degree of autonomy. Empathy requires us
to see others, even the worst criminals, as human beings like ourselves,
to recognize "that others feel and think as we do, that our inner
feelings are alike in some fundamental fashion" that marks us as
fellow human beings.75 Like us, other human beings, even criminals,
must be seen as autonomous entities, "separate and protected in [their]
separation" from others, as we know ourselves to be separate and
protected in our separation from others.76 At the most basic level,
separation from others means that "your body is yours and my body is
mine, and we should respect the boundaries between each other's
bodies."77 The body of the criminal is his (or hers), just as the body of
any human being is his (or hers) and must be accorded a degree of
separation and respect from others. As physically separate, morally
and emotionally autonomous creatures, other human beings, including
criminals, must be accorded basic human rights in recognition of their
inherent human dignity. Thus, it can be said that "[h]uman rights
depend both on self-possession and on the recognition that all others
are equally self-possessed." 7 8
Clearly, to create conditions antithetical to basic human rights
cannot be considered "decent" or demonstrative of respect for the
"dignity of man," because to create such conditions is essentially to
deny and suppress a person's humanity and hence to violate their
inherent human dignity. It is critical to note that, as a general matter,
and in sharp contrast to practices in Western Europe, "American
criminal justice displays a resistance to considering the very
personhood of offenders."79 Nowhere is the routine violation of the
75. LYNN HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A HiSTORY 29 (2007).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. Why should we care about the rights of prisoners, including those who have
committed terrible crimes? Prisoners might be thought of as a special class of refugees sent
into exile from American society as punishment for their crimes. They have lost home, family,
job, and whatever material possessions they might have acquired before their confinement.
They are no longer citizens in any meaningful sense of the term; few prisoners can vote while
confined in prison, and no prisoners are in any meaningful sense citizens of the prisons in
which they are held captive. Prisoners appeal to human rights, or we appeal to human rights
for them, because they have no recourse to assert their humanity in any other way. The sheer
vulnerability of prisoners should call forth an explicit effort to treat them as the human beings
they are, however compromised their current state and however culpable they may be for the
crimes that put them behind bars. For a thoughtful discussion on refugees and human rights,
see LINFIELD, supra note 74, at 37.
79. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 9 (2003). Note that in this body of work, the terms
"personhood" and "human being" are used interchangeably.
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offenders' personhood or humanity more evident than in our prisons,
and especially our high security prisons, to which long-term inmates
are routinely relegated. It is no exaggeration to say that "conditions are
frightening in all high-security American correctional institutions, all
of which suffer from drastic overcrowding, inmate-on-inmate
violence, and guard-on-inmate violence as well."8 0 To this litany of
abuses must be added the virtual absence of privacy, leading to
practices, like routine and often arbitrary cell- and strip-searches,
including cavity searches, that "go mostly unquestioned, and even
unnoticed, in the United States, but that have been wholly or largely
eliminated across the Atlantic," explicitly rejected, for the most part,
"as incompatible with inmate 'dignity.'" There is, in European penal
law and policy, "a fundamental commitment ... towards recognizing
that prisoners should not be degraded" and in fact should be
affirmatively "treated with dignity and mercy." 82 In America's prisons,
by contrast to their Western European counterparts, we seem almost to
revel in the suffering that is inflicted upon offenders, perhaps
confirming that "the core problem of degradation ... is the
intoxication that comes with treating people as inferiors." 83 The
intoxicating quality of treating others as inferiors, in turn, would seem
to be a logical corollary of the operation of our adversarial system.
Adversaries are, in essence, enemies. We wage war against our legal
adversaries. The convicted defendant, vanquished in court, is now a
defeated prisoner, a person marked by infamy and disgrace.
Harsh and often invasive conditions found regularly in
American prisons undermine efforts of prisoners to survive with
dignity. This proposition was demonstrated empirically by the social
scientist Hans Toch. Toch studied the experiences of hundreds of
inmates who endured psychological breakdowns in various types of
prison settings. He found that the absence of the aforementioned
dimensions of humanity, "that is, impotence instead of autonomy, fear
instead of security, and isolation instead of relatedness-interacted
80. Id. at 61. Lifers are usually kept in maximum-security or super maximum-security
prisons that are virtually devoid of vocational, educational, or rehabilitative opportunities.
Loss and degradation are central features of life in these institutions. "The extreme
deprivation, the isolating architecture, the technology of control, and the rituals of degradation
and subjugation that exist in supermax prisons are inimical to the mental health of prisoners."
Craig Haney, A Culture of Harm: Taming the Dynamics of Cruelty in Supermax Prisons, 35
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 956, 961 (2008).
81. WHITMAN, supra note 79, at 65.
82. DIRK VAN ZYL SMIT & SONJA SNACKEN, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN PRISON LAW AND
POLICY: PENOLOGY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 383 (2009).
83. WHITMAN, supra note 79, at 23.
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with one another so as to provoke 'existential questions' about the
individual's sense of self and self-worth that influenced 'crises of
every kind in every setting' and ultimately represented 'universal
motives' associated with human despair." 84 This demonstrates that the
manner in which we treat prisoners in high security settings, such as
those faced by lifers, creates circumstances that are neither decent nor
dignified. Toch's work and others86 lead to the conclusion that
contemporary prisons, particularly as they are experienced by long-
term prisoners, are "dehumanizing" and "hellish,"8 7 and ultimately
"un-survivable,"8 8 due to profound violations of the prisoner's human
dignity.
IV. JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE IS NOT JUSTIFIED BY
LEGITIMATE PENOLOGICAL GOALS
With the Court's words as a guide, and our understanding of
human nature and prison punishment as backdrop, we will argue that
sentencing juveniles to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole can never accord with our prevailing sense of decency. All of
the cases relating to criminal sanctions make clear that sanctions must
serve one or more of the four legitimate ends of punishment in order to
abide by the Eighth Amendment.89 These ends are retribution,
incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation. Life without parole for
juveniles clearly fails on three of these fronts-incapacitation,
deterrence, and rehabilitation-and ultimately fails on the fourth and
final rationale, retribution, as well.
One need not expend any effort to realize that, as a general
matter, the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole serves the end of retribution: it is a punishment, pure and
simple, that produces suffering for its own sake. On its face, the
punishment also serves the goal of incapacitation: while confined,
offenders are incapable of committing crimes in society. Yet, previous
punishments defended on the grounds of incapacitation have been
struck down on the basis of findings that a lesser punishment would
84. JOHNSON, supra note 68, at 205.
85. ROBERT JOHNSON, HARD TIME: UNDERSTANDING AND REFORMING THE PRISON 6 (3d
ed. 2002).
86. Alison Leibling, Moral Performance, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and
Prison Pain, 13 PUNISHMENT & Soc'y 530 (2011).
87. Id. at 543.
88. Id. at 533.
89. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028.
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serve the goal of incapacitation equally well.90 In order to justify
incapacitation as the reason for an irrevocable life sentence in the case
of a juvenile, one must accept the premise that he or she is so depraved
as to be beyond the curative efforts of rehabilitation.91 In Roper and
Graham, the Court has explicitly acknowledged that the immaturity
and vulnerability of juveniles impede the full formation of their
characters and render it impossible to determine whether their crimes
are the product of true depravity that places them beyond the reach of
rehabilitation. As has been noted by scholars, "juveniles are immature
through no fault of their own; their personalities are works in
progress."92 All of this has led to judicial recognition that juveniles are
categorically less culpable than adults who commit similar crimes.
Most importantly, juveniles have been proven to be more receptive to
rehabilitation than their older counterparts. 93 Given these findings, it is
impossible to conclude that juveniles are so irredeemable that
draconian measures are justified in order to ensure their permanent
confinement.
The interest of deterrence is only relevant if the sanction deters,
which is to say, discourages an offender from committing future
crimes and, more importantly, inspires others to abstain from the
commission of crimes. 4 Yet, the Court has accepted the assertion that
juveniles suffer from greater impulsivity than their adult counterparts
and often demonstrate a profound inability to exercise reasoned
judgment and anticipate the consequences of their actions, hence
making them poor candidates for deterrence. In fact, when analyzing
the legitimacy of the State's deterrence interest in Roper, the Court
endorsed the proposition that "[t]he likelihood that the teenage
offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any
weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually
nonexistent."9 With this finding, the Court acknowledges that
juveniles typically will not experience the benefits of any deterrent
effect that a punishment such as the death penalty might have. This
observation also applies to the punishment of life without parole.
When compared to the death penalty, life without parole "involves a
90. Furman, 408 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring).
91. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029.
92. Johnson, supra note 6, at 244.
93. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
94. Deterrence Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/deterrence (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). Deterrence is defined as "the
inhibition of criminal behavior by fear especially of punishment." Id.
95. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837
(1988)).
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death in prison that will be, in many cases, even more distant in time,
and hence more abstract and psychologically remote to juveniles than
death by execution." 96 Therefore, this exceedingly severe punishment
will lack any deterrent effect upon either the juveniles who suffer said
punishment, or future potential juvenile criminals who may hear of it.
Thus, deterrence cannot be offered as a defense for life without parole
in the case of juveniles.
This leaves retribution as the sole interest that may arguably be
served by a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for juveniles.
The best defense of retribution was offered in the case of Gregg v.
Georgia,9 7 which affirmed the constitutionality of the death penalty. In
that case, a majority of the Court concluded that retribution was a
legitimate means of expressing moral condemnation of criminal
conduct and channeling the natural human instinct toward revenge in a
manner that prevents vigilantism.98 Thus, retribution, envisioned as a
species of revenge, is not so much a bid for justice as it is a palliative
to the irrational excesses of emotion. Retributive sentencing will do
nothing for the convict, unless it can be coupled with a strong deterrent
effect. Yet, the Court has found that juveniles are not susceptible to the
positive effects of deterrence.99 More importantly, the Court has
emphatically stated that retribution is insufficient as a justification for
punishment of those whose culpability and moral blameworthiness are
significantly lessened. oo Juveniles have already been spared the death
penalty based upon an explicit finding of reduced culpability and
blameworthiness. In short, when applied to juveniles, society is far less
justified in the sense of rage and moral indignity that it feels upon the
commission of a crime. Therefore, the question becomes whether the
mere act of placating a disgruntled citizenry is sufficient to deprive a
juvenile of any chance to develop into a full human being, benefit
from rehabilitation, and atone for his crime through future
contributions to his fellow man. o0
96. Johnson, supra note 6, at 249.
97. 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976).
98. Id. at 183.
99. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
100. Id. at 571.
101. It should be noted that in a purely philosophical sense, retribution is equivalent to
just deserts-the offender gets the punishment he or she deserves. To deserve punishment, the
offender must be culpable; to be culpable, the offender must have freely chosen to act, which
is only possible if the offender is an autonomous human being. The deserved punishment thus
hinges on the personhood of the offender. For punishment to be just retribution, that
punishment must in turn respect the personhood of the individual being punished. On these
grounds, life without parole fails a retribution punishment for juveniles, because it is
embedded in a system that violates the personhood of offenders, most notably in prison but in
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To answer this question, one must understand what is lost by
denying juveniles any chance of rehabilitation. When they commit
crimes, juveniles do not have the benefit of a fully formed character. In
this condition, the crime cannot be said to be the product of an
incurably depraved person since these offenders are not yet fully
formed as persons. Rather, juveniles, because they are still developing,
are inherently malleable, a central consideration in Roper. As made
clear in Roper and the authoritative research upon which the case
relied, malleability is what makes juveniles more amenable to
rehabilitation than adults. As a result, rehabilitative efforts still retain
the potential to mold a juvenile's character in a positive manner. Many
juveniles end up in prison precisely because they have never been
exposed to positive role models or influences.' 0  Few positive role
models are to be found in our harsh prisons. As has been noted,
"[p]risons are monuments to punishment and exclusion and the code of
life in prison embodies the exact sort of immaturity, impulsivity, and
aggression that the Court in Roper claims that juveniles may overcome
if given suitable punishments."
The conditions of life in American prisons would be traumatic
for anyone. Yet, they are much worse for juveniles sentenced to life
without parole. Juveniles serving life without parole have no hope of
ever experiencing any positive consequences of maturation, including
the flowering of key attributes of what it means to be a human being-
a sense of self marked by autonomy, security, and relatedness to
others. These basic deficiencies, in turn, stunt empathy and the
capacity to feel remorse. In the terms used in this Article, the perpetual
adolescence these prisoners show as a result of life in prison means
that their personhood or status as developed human beings is
profoundly impaired, possibly damaged permanently by the repressive
prison environment. Arguably, their fate is sealed before they have
even fully grown up.
Not only does the culture of prison life reinforce the impulsive
immaturity of adolescence, but also, as noted by the Court in Graham,
the existence of a life sentence is the dispositive factor in
many aspects of the justice process as well, and because, in the case of juveniles, their
personhood is as yet unfinished, making punishment per se a questionable practice from a
philosophical point of view. Juveniles are not fully developed as persons, and exposure to
prison as punishment will almost certainly retard if not prevent the development of their
personhood. On purely philosophical grounds, then, life without parole for juveniles fails all of
the theoretical rationales for punishment.
102. ELIZABETH S. Scolrt & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 53
(2008).
103. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 249.
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determinations of whether a prisoner is eligible for rehabilitative
services that might offer a path to some version of mature
adulthood.104 By establishing this unilateral distinction, society
ensures that even a hardened adult recidivist serving a lengthy
sentence short of life will have a better chance of positive growth by
virtue of their access to rehabilitative services than will a juvenile
serving a life term without the possibility of parole.10 5 Juveniles
serving life without parole will rarely receive such access, no matter
how much they may deserve it, by virtue of age or capacity to mature.
The very circumstances of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole, then, essentially preclude the possibility of
personal development for juveniles, much less their rehabilitation.
Without rehabilitative efforts, it is impossible for juveniles to mature
and grow. Their development as human beings essentially ceases upon
their entrance into prison. Research provides a vivid description of the
emotional impact on juvenile offenders of a life without parole
sentence:
As they age, juveniles serving life without parole can
become more emotionally stable within the highly
structured routine of prison life, but they typically do
not become more emotionally mature and autonomous;
if anything, lifers become less emotionally mature and
autonomous and more dependent on prison routine to
manage their daily existence. They live on the surface
of things, by routine and rote; their lives are superficial,
which is why lifers seem not to mature emotionally as
the years pass. They typically get through each day on
"automatic pilot," with little thought or reflection.
Prisons can be compared to a deep freeze in the sense
that personal autonomy-the capacity for mature self-
106
management-stops at the point of entry into prison.
In Roper and Graham, the Supreme Court has recognized that
juveniles are capable of reform and rehabilitation as they move into
adulthood. Life without parole denies them this opportunity.
This most severe punishment literally gives up on a human
being who faces diminished culpability and has yet to fully mature.
104. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033.
105. John Irwin examines the reformative power of hope among lifers who are eligible
for parole. See JOHN IRWIN, LIFERS: SEEKING REDEMPTION IN PRISON (2009).
106. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 251-252.
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More than simply abandoning juveniles on the basis of retribution, the
government does not even take precautions to shield them from the
population of hardened adult criminals. Like all of those sentenced to
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, most juveniles
facing this penalty are placed directly into adult prisons,10 7 relegating
them to an environment in which they will be surrounded by negative
influences. This will virtually ensure that they will become the very
sort of incurable, depraved criminals who allegedly deserve retributive
sentences in the first place.
All of these facts must be balanced against the benefits of using
retributive sentences as a balm to calm the citizenry. In his dissent in
Gregg v. Georgia, Justice Marshall stated that "the mere fact that the
community demands the murderer's life in return for the evil he has
done cannot sustain the death penalty." 08 The same can be said for
life without parole. While this view was expressed in dissent, it
reflects the discomfort felt by a majority of the Justices for
punishments based solely upon retribution. However, in this context,
retribution is the only ground offered in support of life imprisonment.
Moreover, retribution must contend with numerous counter factors that
argue for an increased emphasis on rehabilitation. Outside of the
criminal context, the State recognizes the immaturity and vulnerability
of juveniles by the assertion of broad powers in support of a duty to
ensure their welfare. A strictly retributive approach is not consonant
with this duty. A societal need to express moral disapproval is
insufficient to justify abandoning a child and denying them means for
reform before they have ever had the chance to gain life experience
and maturity. This purely punitive approach fails to acknowledge the
dignity of these uniquely malleable human beings and subjects them to
107. Adult lifers are placed directly into maximum-security prisons as a matter of
course. There is no research published to date on the security level of the adult prisons to
which juvenile serving life without parole are placed. Ongoing research indicates that
juveniles go directly to maximum- or medium-security institutions, with early trends
suggesting that medium-security facilities are the more likely original destination for these
offenders. Personal communication with Ashley Nellis, Research Analyst, The Sentencing
Project (8/26/10) (on file with author). Ironically, juveniles may be safer in maximum-security
prisons since those settings, though oppressive, tend to be highly controlled. Medium-security
prisons, by contrast, often feature dormitory housing (maximum-security prisons feature cells)
and fairly fluid movements of prisoners within their secure perimeters (movement is sharply
restricted in maximum-security prisons). Dorm living and prisoner movement can make
medium-security prisons hard to control and may subject juveniles to more predation than
they would experience in the higher security institutions. For a wide-ranging discussion of
differing prison environments and their effects on adjustment, see ROBERT JOHNSON, HARD
TIME: UNDERSTANDING AND REFORMING THE PRISON 163 (3d ed. 2002).
108. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 240 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the kind of "pointless infliction of suffering" 109 that is proscribed by
the Eighth Amendment. The Court has explicitly found that juveniles
are less culpable and more capable of change. The State cannot give
force to this truth by subjecting its most vulnerable citizens to a
punishment that presupposes mature culpability and an inability to
change.
V. CONCLUSION: JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SHOULD BE
PROSCRIBED IN ALL CASES
Life without parole for juveniles is incompatible with the
Supreme Court's own findings about life imprisonment as described
herein, and is also in conflict with the Court's stated respect for human
dignity. These findings have been deemed sufficient to proscribe both
the death penalty for juveniles and life without parole for juveniles
convicted of non-homicide crimes. No empirical evidence is available
to demonstrate why these findings should not underpin a rationale for
the elimination of life without parole for juveniles in all cases. The
nature of the crime does not change the fact that a juvenile's character
is not fully formed, that they suffer from unique impairments that
reduce their culpability, and that they remain able to change with
rehabilitation. When addressing life without parole for non-homicide
crimes, the Court endorsed the need for rehabilitation by stating that
the juvenile should not be deprived of the opportunity
to achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of
human worth and potential. In Roper, that deprivation
resulted from an execution that brought life to its end.
Here, though by a different dynamic, the same concerns
apply. Life in prison without the possibility of parole
gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no
chance for reconciliation with society, no hope.
Maturity can lead to that considered reflection which is
the foundation for remorse, renewal, and
rehabilitation. 10
The severity of a juvenile's crime does not vitiate the truth of
this statement. The Court in Graham seems to imply that life without
parole sentences might be appropriate for those who are convicted of
the crime of murder, a uniquely serious crime that the Court appeared
109. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972).
110. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010).
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to view as a marker of depravity. The crime of homicide is a
uniquely serious crime, to be sure, but there is no empirical evidence
supporting the claim that the crime of murder, in and of itself, is an
indicator of depravity for juveniles. 112 Juveniles convicted of murder,
as noted above, remain juveniles.
The Court has previously manifested distrust for the corruptive
power of retributive influences, creating a categorical rule against
application of the death penalty to juveniles rather than allowing juries
to weigh mitigating evidence on a case-by-case basis. The Court
should follow the same course of action with regard to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. This represents a
logical application of the findings that it has already made.
No life can be fully judged on the basis of less than 18 years.
No child deserves to be abandoned. Every juvenile offender must be
given the opportunity to demonstrate positive change. To "deny
[juvenile offenders] even the opportunity to be heard by a parole board
is to ignore the most basic premise upon which the Court in Roper
ruled." That premise-simple, clear, and compelling-is this:
"[w]hen a juvenile offender commits a heinous crime, the State can
exact forfeiture of some of the most basic liberties, but the State
cannot extinguish his life and his potential to attain a mature
understanding of his own humanity."1 4 Life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole abruptly closes the book before the final chapter
has been written.
111. Robert Johnson & Sonia Tabriz, Sentencing Children to Death by Incarceration: A
Deadly Denial ofSocial Responsibility, 91 PRISON J. 198,200 (2011).
112. Id.
113. Johnson, supra note 6, at 251.
114. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573-74 (2005)).
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